[Korean Film News] What The Host Can Learn From Tae Guk Gi

Now that Magnolia Pictures is (finally) taking the mutant tadpole to the States, what lessons can be learned from its less than stellar performance elsewhere around the film trotting globe? Perhaps a case study recently posted at the newly overhauled English-language website of the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) analyzing the release of Tae Guk Gi in the US in 2004 can enlighten us. According to the paper (Case Study on Tae Guk Gi, Joan H. Lee, 2005), the author noted 1) an increase in the number of specialty (read 'independent and foreign language') films exhibited in the US; 2) that DVD and other products, including online delivery will impact the way films are released. Two conclusions drawn from the study were that 1) Korean films are marketable commodities in the US and; 2) that commercial and art-house films need to be marketed differently. By commercial films, Lee means action/comedy/horror pictures with good-looking popular stars. Art-house films are defined as very well made high quality pictures with inspiring stories, beautiful scenery and historical and cultural references. I confess to having been not a little confused by all this, as many Korean commercial films don’t meet these criteria, and not a few 'art-house' movies not only feature good-looking stars but don’t necessarily rely upon beautiful scenery or inspiring stories. Lee goes on to say that one of the evident weaknesses of the Korean film industry consists in uneven regional expansion: Japan alone accounts for nearly 70% of international sales. This makes the Korean film industry particularly vulnerable to whims of fashion and political wrangling, another reason why the Korean industry needs to reach out to other territories, i.e. English-speaking ones. However, in 2001, foreign language films accounted for only .4% of US box office, and of this number, British films were 10 times more likely to attract viewers than non-English ones.

Not very encouraging numbers. So is there some hidden, untapped market in the US for Korean movies? Lee begins by examining the film environment in the States, noting that, while US ticket sales had been steadily declining, revenue from the sale and rental of DVDs increased more than 40% in 2003. She goes on to remark that as production costs rise, pressure is applied for earlier openings across all windows -- home video, pay cable, network TV, foreign TV, etc. Bolstering her argument that foreign films are a viable commodity in the US, Lee points out that in 2001, online rental outlet Netflix reported that foreign titles represented 12% of its rental activity. My math skills aren’t that great, but it would appear that the number of those watching foreign titles at home was 12 times greater than at the neighborhood multiplex (at least among those who rented films online). Why the disparity? A lack of foreign films being shown? Apparently not. The number of foreign titles shown in theaters actually doubled between 1990 and 2000 [note: a release may be just one theater in NY], saturating the market and leading specialty films to compete with one another. The success of home theater has meant that DVDs and broadband are diverting a significant portion of the audience from movie houses. Evidently, what is good for Netflix is not necessarily good for distributors of Korean film.

Some of the questions posed by the study were: 1) what is the audience for Korean films? 2) what makes Korean films attractive to distributors? and; 3) how are US buyers exposed to Korean films?

According to the study, the typical specialty filmgoer is over 30-years-old, a city dweller, well-educated, liberal, and earning a higher than average income. His/her primary source for watching Korean titles was DVD, which accounted for 44.4% of watchers, followed by video rental from Korean stores (53.3%) and movie theaters (11.1%). Film festivals accounted for another 11.1 %. Distributors rely mostly on screeners provided by Korean sales companies, followed by film festivals and markets at Cannes, Toronto and the American Film Market (AFM) in Los Angeles. So how did the distributor go about marketing Tae Guk Gi?

In 2004, it was decided that theatrical release should be before the local video hit the streets (it ought to be noted that The Host is scheduled to come out in theaters two months following its release on Korean DVD). It was decided that the majority of advertising for Tae Guk Gi should target Korean-Americans. The amount of advertising was as follows:

Newspaper 33%
Television 12 %
Radio 8%
Internet 2% [!]
Magazine 1%
[Doesn't total 100% due to other miscelaneous costs]

In the end, the film quite unsurprisingly failed to cross over to art-house audiences. In LA and NY, 90%-95% of viewers were Korean and Korean-American. Even so, Tae Guk Gi pulled in a highly respectable US $1.1 million at the box office. Were it not for a lack of preparation, the film might have done considerably better still. The film’s distributor had only 3 months from the film’s acquisition in June until its release in September 2004 to develop a marketing strategy and put it into motion, whereas Magnolia Pictures has had significantly more time. By dragging its heels, Magnolia is missing out on the opportunity to release The Host before viewers have had a chance to see it on video. I for one won’t be holding my breath, as their recent theatrical release of Nicolas Winding Refn’s Pusher trilogy was a complete farce – an absence of information on the Web and the picture was never even shown in the Detroit area.

Given the weakness of the US market: declining box office receipts, intense competition for screens, mega-budgets, competition with other niche films as well as the rise in home theater, coupled with the poor performance of foreign film in general (less than 1% market share), the Korean film industry has set itself the modest goal of .06% US box office and a gross of US $6.6 million by 2010. In 2004, Korean films took in a mere .04% of US box office and US $3 million.